Although Imai did not mention the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) in his presentation, the Japanese government’s decision to deploy the SDF troops is inseparable from Imai’s kidnapping incident. The three hostages were captured due to their Japanese nationality, and in exchange for releasing the hostages, the captors demanded a withdrawal of the Self-Defense Forces (SDF). I will introduce two opposing statements made by famous Japanese pundits/TV journalists that tie the Imai kidnapping to the SDF. These two stances can help us understand how the Japanese understood the April 2004 kidnapping incident in relation to the SDF’s presence in Iraq.
Background: Article 9 of Japan’s Constitution, the “No War” clause, explicitly restricts the SDF from engaging in war activities to settle international disputes. Considering the Constitution’s restrictions and Japan’s past military history, the decision to deploy SDF troops to Iraq provoked heated political debates. In the midst of political controversy, Japanese SDF troops were sent to Iraq’s relatively safe area of Samawa to engage in humanitarian relief tasks in December of 2003. The ground troops were pulled out in July of 2006, but the airforce continues its transportation (of other/UN forces, supplies) activities from Kuwait.
(SDF activities in Iraq from Japanese Ministry of Defense website)
Sakurai Yoshiko is a journalist and news commentator in her early 60s identified as part of the pro-American conservatives. In her blog entry from April 2004 entitled, “There are two rules even in an emergency: never yield to terrorism and acknowledge ’self-responsibility,’” she seems to sympathize with the family members of the three hostages. She even conveys respect towards photojournalist Kôriyama Sôichirô’s need to report on the events in Iraq. Still, she stresses that the government designated Iraq an “extremely dangerous area” with its highest level of warning notice. Sakurai points out that TV news and newspapers had been reporting on the dangers of Iraq for days, and yet, the three hostages entered Iraq at their own discretion. To their decision and action, she replies that “the bravery of stepping into a dangerous war zone, becomes something to admire only when it’s hand in hand with self-responsibility.” She recognizes that “the Japanese government, obviously, must protect the lives and ensure the safety of Japanese citizens. To do everything in their power is a given.” At the same time, however, she commends Koizumi’s decision not to comply with the “terrorists’ demands” and to not pull out the SDF.
(Sakurai Yoshiko’s April 24th, 2004 blog entry)
Chikushi Tetsuya, a television anchorperson in his early 70s known for his liberal stances, questioned the SDF’s presence in Iraq in light of the kidnapping incident. On his news program (NEWS 23), he called the attacks directed at the hostages’ families a “problem.” He also contests the argument that the kidnapping was “jigoujitoku” (that they brought the incident upon themselves). Chikushi points out that “the Japanese government does not consider Iraq a definitively violent region. Their argument for sending the SDF is based on the assertion that there is a safe area in Iraq, a ‘noncombatant area.’” If Iraq is not safe, the logical foundation of the SDF’s deployment “will crumble.” He also adds that “the three captured in Iraq, at least did not do anything for their own benefit.” Chikushi ends his news program by asking his viewers to compare the hostages to those criticizing the hostages: “Do we consider young people like [the hostages] necessary or not? Compared to the slanderers, which do we consider necessary? We should question which group is necessary.”
(Chikushi Tetsuya’s comments reported in the Japanese Communist Party’s April 15, 2004 “Akahata” newspaper)
Although using these two opinions as representative of an entire nation’s stance on the SDF grossly simplifies the issues involved in the SDF debate, I think Sakurai and Chikushi’s viewpoints illuminate the Japanese attitudes toward the SDF’s deployment. Sakurai defends the SDF’s presence as an opposition to terrorism. Chikushi, on the other hand, questions the SDF’s presence, because they are clearly in an area of international conflict.
Considering the political implications of the deployment, it is interesting to see how the public support of the SDF troops fluctuates:
In July 2003, “Do you support the sending of the SDF to Iraq?” 53% NO, 39% YES
In November 2003, “Do you support the sending of the SDF to Iraq?” 60% No, 33% YES
In February 2004 (after the deploment of SDF troops to Iraq): 44% NO, 49% YES.
The Febrary 2004 survey also asked questions on former Prime Minister Koizumi’s actions that reveal an interesting aspect of the Japanese support of the troops and their support of the war. When asked, “Is PM Koizumi’s explanation (that since Saddam Hussein could not prove that Iraq had no WMDs, it is Hussein’s responsibility, and therefore the war was the correct move) correct?”
63% said Koizumi was wrong and 16% answered he was correct. It seems like supporting the SDFs does not correspond to approving the war and the reasoning behind it.
And in light of our discussions on youth indifference towards politics, this generational breakdown of the disapproval towards Koizumi’s reasoning, shows that Japanese youth are in fact more critical than older generations.
20’s: Correct 9%, Mistaken 79%
30’s: Correct 19%, Mistaken 74%
40’s: Correct 7%, Mistaken 71%
50’s: Correct 10%, Mistaken 70%
60’s and above: Correct 23%, Mistaken 49%
And since the SDF’s actions are restricted to humanitarian relief work in the region of Samawa, the survey asked if people thought that the SDF could satisfactorily answer the expectations of the prople of the region. 56% responded that they couldn’t, and 31% answered that they could. Judging from these quantitative data, it seems like the Japanese do not support the war, they do not support Koizumi’s reasoning in involving Japan in the war, and they don’t believe that the SDF can answer to the needs of the Samawans. Are they conflating supporting the SDF troops with the decision to send the SDF to Iraq? Also does the Japanese support of the SDF (or opposition to) shed any insight onto our previous discussions on Japanese “indifference” towards politics?
Update: There is a different news program poll taken in 2006 that reflects on the Japanese involvement in Iraq. According to this poll from April 2006, 43.7% of the population thought the SDF’s deployment was worthwhile, 46.9% viewed it was not, and 9.4% did not know.
-Makiko
