shifting perspectives

Koyama-san’s visit, to me, was all about shifting analytical perspectives. As a newcomer to both intersex topics and disability theory, Koyama-san’s presentation of intersex characteristics as disorder intrigued me. My limited understanding of intersex always placed the issues involved solely in the realm of LGBTQ studies. Approaching intersex from a disability perspective, therefore, challenged my preconceptions of intersex individuals (or people with DSD) and also the connotations that “disability” carries. On a related note, spending time with Koyama-san did not only shed light on to the unfriendliness of general facilities toward physically disabled individuals, but her visit also forced me to be self-conscious of the actions I took around people with disabilities. I think my self-consciousness emerged from the preconceptions I hold regarding disability.

Another topic on which Koyama-san presented was transracial adoptions. This issue stimulated a very engaging discussion on our class chalk site. Several of us had difficulties accepting her arguments that presented a somewhat unilateral process in transracial and international adoptions. Her presentation, however, convinced me on a broad theoretical level, the racist and orientalist structure of these adoptions. The images, rhetoric, and ideologies behind some of the adoption agencies and media portrayals feed into this larger structure perpetuating race and geographical area hierarchies. While I see all this as an outsider, I am still ambivalent as to where I stand on the issue of transracial and international adoptions. It still seems like it is a personal decision that prioritizes individual children’s interests first. I see the dangerous structure Koyama-san depicted in the adoptions, especially when contextualized in contingent historical events and periods. If anything, Koyama-san’s presentation and her visit complicate the debate, problematizing an accepted practice–which, I think, is her aim in the first place.

a masochistic patriotism

Tawara-san ended his talk on Thursday by declaring how much he loved his country–perhaps even more than Abe–despite its flaws. This closing to what conservatives would most likely have labeled a “masochistic” lecture seemed to throw out a question that is ultimately at the heart of the whole textbook controversy. What exactly is patriotism? Tawara-san’s love for Japan juxtaposed with his opposition to patriotic education exemplifies how loving one’s country and remaining critical of its actions are not mutually exclusive positions. As May posted in her chalk entry, masochistic criticism from individuals like Tawara-san should be “a sign of a more loyal citizen who wishes to see his/her country progress and improve.” I think this is a more palatable portrayal of patriotic citizens than the self-sacrificing foot-soldiers Abe and the right have in mind by stressing a citizen’s “act of ‘loving’” his or her country (True Nature of Abe Shinzo). The activism of the visitors we have had in the past two months reify this alternative understandig of patriotism, I think. While our guests may not appreciate such label, they reassured me of the present movements in Japan that have the country’s interests in maintaining peace and spreading awareness in mind.

While our visitors are hopeful signs, the present upheaval over revising past Japanese wrongs in textbooks and patriotic curricula painfully teach me how history is definitely not on a teleological path of progress. For every Ienaga lawsuit and victory, there will always be a retaliation from the likes of Abe and new textbook supporters. And this ongoing struggle leads to the question of who will inherit the activism of older figures like Tawara-san. Like the 15 women in Nakajima-san’s case, comfort women from the Pacific War, and Nagasaki/Hiroshima hibakusha, key witnesses and participants who are willing to come forth and participate in social movements are impressively from older generations. Though several of our guests have expressed hope in younger generations and students with new vehicles like the internet and transnational dialogue, some of the realities of Japanese youth still alarm me. It is baffling to read about politicians and even academics who believe in the importance of interweaving patriotism in history lessons when the majority of students are not even aware of the war between the US and Japan. There seems to be a more urgent task for education reformers in Japan that does not include evaluating patriotism–however defined.

As a final note, I want to comment on how much I enjoyed Tawara-san’s visit. His talks were extremely informative and he presented in a way that was very easy to understand. During the class dinner, I found him very approachable as we beleaugered him with questions while he ate.

koyama san’s talk

Emi san’s talk on DSD was very interesting in that the issue provokes us to think about how individuals determine “anomaly” and minority status based on social structure. It reminded me of my older sister with slight limb deformity caused by childhood polio who grew up in Japan constantly sensing a various reactions to how her fingers looked. Every time she entered a new community, i.e. a group of classmates or coworkers whom she would have to regularly meet in school or workplace, she first had to explain the cause of her deformity and then to demonstrate that she was as smart and friendly as everyone else, which usually assured others to treat her as a “normal.” This repeated conscious performance of being “normal” has been a major part of her social and personal life, and as she grew up, she seems to have greatly internalized the value of being “normal,” and, perhaps naturally, now became a rather conservative adult who highly values meritocracy. In her view, for example, poverty in urban America is mainly attributable more to the lack of poor residents’ effort than to social structure and government policies. Considering what my sister has gone through as she grew up in Japan, however, it is clear that her opinion, too, is a product of social constraints that kept demanding her to be “normal” all the time. For her, being “normal” meant to make much effort in academic achievement and following the mainstream consumerism. In the process of asserting her “normalcy,” it could be the case that she ended up holding a critical view on other marginalized groups.

Koyama san talked about various perceptions of the DSD/intersex from different directions, some look at it as a medical condition and other as a gender identity. Her talk inspired me to think how we tend to overlook that we are encased in social structure where some efforts to assert rights or serve interests, whether they are disabled, sexual minorities, their parents etc., could sometimes result in enforcing social sense of normalcy and in effect reproducing stigmatized groups.

 

Education today

When thinking of education, it is often the case that imagination of ideal school teachers and children greatly varies depending on one’s perspective. I recently have been surprised by the level of information and communication on-line that school children are exposed to; I hope it is an extreme case but one of my friends in Japan found out some of so called “online ultra-right” (netto uyoku) turned out to be elementary school students with a high-level writing skill. It seems that what I imagine as an elementary school student no longer exists, and school education may need to adjust to current conditions surrounding children. Because it is nearly impossible to force children not to use internet (it’s everywhere in Japanese society), one effort may be to include a class on media literacy, i.e. how to read internet media critically, or how to nurture morality on-line. I hope that Tawara san’s group can start raising question on these issue (among other things), which probably the current government, having a certain ideal image of obedient school children in mind, overlooks.

At the same time, I am beginning to see that many high shcool students who have a hard time conforming to school society find alternatives and more comfort outside the school (just as I did 10+years ago). I agree with Tawara san’s remark that going to school should not be seen as children’s obligation and there are many alternatives to enjoy life in society.

 

A lasting framework

Tawara Yoshifumi, our last visitor of the quarter, spoke yesterday about Japan’s steady preparation for military combat. He argued that contemporary Japan has developed the military hardware and the legal basis for waging war, however, due to citizen aversion, the LDP–that is the blue blooded junta ruling Japan–has been unable to fully institutionalize the military. In order to create a citizenry willing to die for the nation, Tawara argues, the state must first transform the nature of education. Indeed, rather than a system of education based on the principles of individuality and human rights, conservative groups have proposed one that would inculcate national pride and popular patriotism.

Anyone who might believe that Tawara is overstating the situation, that he is depicting Abe as too radical, need only look to some of Prime Minister Abe’s recent statements. In a September 2006 speech, for example, Abe declared, “the purpose of education is to raise citizens dedicated to their aspirations and to create a dignified nation and society.” In a January 2007 speech, Abe argued that Japan must overcome the postwar system since world transformations have rendered it obsolete. He goes on to declare 2007 to be “The First Year for Creating a Beautiful Country.” These statements, in addition to Abe’s intimate involvement in organizations devoted to refuting Japan’s involvement in the system of military sexual slavery and Nanjing Massacre, should disabuse anyone of the notion that Abe is just another conservative.

One of the issues that stands out to me is that the battle being fought in contemporary Japan has its roots in the immediate postwar years. Indeed, the left and the right are waging the war of their parents (or in Abe’s case of his grandfather). The conservatives want to overturn the progressive framework–which came about as a result of the alliance between Japanese leftists and the early progressively inclined practitioners of pax-Americana–and the leftists want to retain it.  The battle, then, is about overcoming the legacies of the postwar. However, despite the surface similarities between the right and the left–in that they are both waging war through the symbolic rhetoric of the postwar–I believe that the contemporary right and left in Japan are speaking about fundamentally different issues. For the right, the postwar represents a time of national humiliation when the US imposed victor’s justice on a once proud nation. For the left, to the contrary, the postwar system is one of international human rights, not necessarily connected to the “national character” of Japan. Thus, while both sides speak about the postwar, it seems that they are talking about fundamentally different issues.

This post is getting a little out of hand, so let me get to the main point. I am fascinated by the fact that the postwar system is still so powerful. Indeed, despite the best efforts of a very powerful ruling elite, the system has by and large remained. Tawara and Nakajima have pointed to the people as the primary reason for this extraordinary longevity of an imposed system. This, no doubt, is true. But why do average Japanese care so much about a system that was born of occupation? And why does the nationalist, “bright country” rhetoric of Abe and friends not succeed in totally dismantling the postwar?

As a very preliminary answer, I would like to suggest that the postwar system is so powerful precisely because it is one based on international human rights. It is an example of–if I’m remembering my political philosophy correctly–a “Kantian conception of society” in which rational humans step outside of historical circumstances and create a wholly progressive system. Nationalists have failed because they are attacking an abstract system of human rights discourse with nationalist rhetoric. Vague formulations of a bright country simply do not have the conceptual force of abstract, progressive discourse on human rights, even if this abstract discourse is only imperfectly instantiated in contemporary Japan. Why do the Japanese need a bright future, when they have a nation that is–however imperfectly–based on progressive understandings of human rights.